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Abstract 
Europeanization investigates how political integration in Europe affects the 
domestic power structures and policies. Less research has been carried out on 
what impact the EU has on national public administrations. It is in fact disputed 
whether administrative Europeanization even exists. Furthermore, there is no 
explicit European model of administration; no blueprint that the EU can enforce in 
its member states or candidate countries. It was recognized that the candidate 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe had too poor administrative capacity to be 
able to implement and enforce the EU legislation. Therefore, something had to be 
done, and Twinning was the answer, now extended to additional countries. 
Twinning is a program in which a public administration official from a member 
state is chosen to assist the beneficiary country for a period of time, usually two 
years. The Commission supervises and finances the programme. The 
responsibility of reaching a sufficient administrative capacity thereby lies partly 
on the shoulders of the MS and the Commission.  
Two questions arise. Are peculiarities in the CEEC administrations accepted 
by the member states and by the Commission? And does the Twinning 
programme result in Europeanization of administration, and if so, how? 
I have answered these questions by studying theoretical literature of 
Europeanization. Such literature takes its stand in the theoretical perspectives of 
‘new institutionalisms’. Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological 
Institutionalism are the most common reference points, but I have included 
Historical Institutionalism for a wider understanding. I have also analysed 
evaluations of the Twinning programme conducted by both MS and Commission 
actors, to reveal the attitudes of different EU actors upon administrative 
integration. I have used the theoretical literature to draw up ideal types to be used 
for analysing the evaluations. 
My conclusions are that:  
1. Norms and values are being Europeanized within a framework of 
existing institutional norms and values but this does not necessarily 
result in tangible convergence of administrative structures. 
2. The administrative legacies from the communist past of the CEECs to a 
great extent hamper even modest reform programmes such as 
Twinning.  
3. Peculiarities of CEEC administrations are viewed upon with scepticism 
even in cases where they do not hamper good administration.  
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Abbreviations 
• BC  Beneficiary Country 
• CARDS  Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation 
for Western Balkans 
• CC Candidate Country 
• CEEC Central and East European Countries 
• DG Directorate-General 
• EAS European Administrative Space 
• EU European Union  
• HR Human Resources 
• JHA Justice and Home Affairs 
• MEDA  the principal financial instrument of the European Union for the 
implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership  
• MS Member States 
• NAT National Administrative Traditions 
• NCP  National Contact Point 
• NPM New Public Management 
• OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
• OMC Open Method of Coordination 
• OMAS The Organisation for Monitoring and Assessment Services 
• PA Public Administration 
• PAR Public Administration Reform 
• PHARE Pologne-Hongrie, Aide à la Restructuration Economique 
• RCI Rational Choice Institutionalism 
• RTA Resident Twinning Adviser 
• SI Sociological Institutionalism 
• Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
• SSAS State-Socialist Administrative Space 
• TA Technical Assistance 
• TACIS Technical Assistance to 12 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia – 
the Commonwealth of Independent States 
• UK United Kingdom 
• Sigma Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and 
Eastern European Countries 
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1 Introduction 
Administration has traditionally not been a matter of either the Commission, or 
other sources of supranational, influence (Olsen 2007 p. 261). The European 
Union consists of as many administrative traditions as member states, and as long 
as the national administrations successfully implemented EU policy, the state of 
affairs was of no concern. Administrative capacity was, perhaps as a result of this, 
not included in the Copenhagen criteria; the standards that the candidate countries 
have to fulfil in order to gain membership in the Union. However, the CEEC 
administrations were too poorly organized to be able to implement the acquis 
communautaire, which every member state is obliged to. This problem was 
recognized in the Madrid Summit of 1995, stating that administrations in the 
CEEC had to be improved. 
The instrument called for was Twinning, a much institutionalized form of 
administrative learning through interconnection and thus a manifestation of the 
theoretical concept of Europeanization. The aim with the programme is to 
facilitate implementation of the acquis. However, Twinning is also likely to 
produce more complex forms of Europeanization. These side-effects tell us 
something about what direction administrative integration takes under influence 
of active European support, and whether this development is accepted.  
It is interesting to examine what the main actors’ views on administration are. 
Is there an agreement that national administrations ought to, as far as possible, be 
arranged in accordance with national traditions or do some actors have visions of 
a more integrated European model of administration, a so called European 
Administrative Space? If so, who ought to have the power to influence the 
administrative organisation within a state? The Commission, the other Member 
States or is it solely a national matter? This thesis will try to shine some light on 
these abstract questions by studying the Twinning program. 
 
 
 
 
Mats Kullander 
2009 
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1.1 Statement of Purpose 
Extensive research exists concerning what Europeanization is and how it works. 
There is not, however, extensive research of how the political actors, like the 
Commission or the Member States (MS), relate to the Europeanization 
phenomenon when they face it and whether they take advantage of it deliberately. 
Particularly intriguing are these questions in the context of administrative 
integration, where Europeanization has been contested. As Scherperel (2004) has 
shown, the new member states’ administrations rest upon an administrative 
tradition that is quite different from the ones in the old member states. I will try to 
answer the question:  
1. Is the different administrative tradition in Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC) tolerated or is the EU trying to transform 
the administrations into a more ‘European’ model?  
I will try to answer this question by analyzing evaluations of Twinning
1
 made by 
different actors. Although my reasoning mainly will circle around the specific 
issue of Twinning, my ambition is that the result will reveal something about 
visions of administrative integration on a more abstract level.  
My hypotheses are that the Commission has a vision of an integrated 
administration in Europe, a much developed European Administrative Space 
(Olsen 2007 p. 252ff.) based on a European administrative model and that the 
Commission for this reason tends to look upon administrative peculiarities with 
more scepticism. The member states in contrast strive to preserve their different 
administrative traditions, and therefore accept that CEECs administrations differ 
from their own. These hypotheses will be tested in the thesis. The main purpose of 
my discussion is to illuminate the complexity of administrative integration, and 
discuss what responsibility different actors have and think they ought to have. 
My second question has to be dealt with in order to put the first question in its 
proper context. 
2.  How and why does Twinning cause administrative integration? 
I define administrative integration as the gradual fading of national administrative 
traditions and the gradual increase of compatibility with other administrative 
models in Europe. It does not necessarily mean convergence, although 
administrative integration usually implies that the administration imports 
structures or ways of framing and labelling from a(nother) MS. Europeanization 
will be the theoretical framework in which I paint my study. It has been one of the 
most active research fields within European studies since the 1990s and it is 
strongly coloured by, or rather a manifestation of, the institutional turn within 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 I will use the term Twinning consistently, even though it is called transition facility in the new member states. 
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political science. It thus contains theoretical tools from both Rational Choice 
Institutionalism (RCI) and Sociological Institutionalism (SI) (Börzel & Risse 
2003 p. 58-73). I will follow Bulmer’s (2007) recommendation and include 
Historical Institutionalism (HI) in my understanding of the empirical material. All 
three belong to the ‘new institutionalism’.  
Many have argued that there is no administrative blueprint that the EU can 
enforce upon the member states, and it is unclear how Europeanization works 
when there is no European model. This essay is thus also a study on this that lies 
on a more abstract level. We are now witnessing a public administration ‘turn’ in 
EU studies which also this thesis is a manifestation of (Trondal 2007 p. 961). 
According to Demmke, the public administration Europeanization theory 
“certainly represents an important intellectual interest” (cited in Matei and Matei 
2008 p. 50).   
My model to be tested is that Twinning produces Europeanization (in two 
versions as we will see). Europeanization in turn produces effects on the 
administrative integration. As a result of this, actors’ views on administrative 
integration can be studied by analyzing evaluations of Twinning. 
 
1.2 Method and Material 
My investigation attempts to follow certain methodological guidelines enabling 
me to draw conclusions of administrative integration.  
Twinning is chosen because it is the main instrument that the EU uses to 
strengthen administrative capacity in candidate states and new member states 
(European Commission 2001 p. 25). At first sight, it seems to have several 
elements that are likely to influence administrative integration. Therefore, by 
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studying evaluations of the programme Twinning, it is possible to draw 
conclusions about the evaluator’s norms of administrative integration in Europe. 
However, in a case-study like this, one must recognize the difficulties of 
generalizing from the results (Landman 2004 p. 34-35). I will make my strategic 
choices explicit at every time, to enable the reader to follow in my footstep and 
judge my results accordingly. A case study has the advantage of allowing the 
researcher a more in depth understanding of the phenomenon (Ibid.), and as 
Twinning is the most important administrative instrument, the results will be 
interesting per se, even without generalizations. 
The underlying methodological assumption that supports my focus on the 
evaluations is that it is impossible to conduct an evaluation without basing it on 
values, ideals or norms. I rely in this choice of method on the Swedish evaluation 
guru Evert Vedung: 
“Evaluations are an integrated part of the fight over power in political and 
administrative systems. Therefore, evaluations are permeated by strategic 
considerations. Evaluation is a game, with the sole purpose of deluding the 
opponents” (Vedung 1998 p. 97 [my translation from Swedish]). 
Evaluations do not necessarily contain the true values of the evaluator, at least not 
explicitly. The evaluators (in the involved administrations) seek to give a positive 
picture of their work (Tulmets 2005 p. 671-2). Therefore, I must get a proper 
understanding of the evaluator’s position and the Europeanization processes at 
work, to be able to get small pieces of information that can be put together into a 
greater picture. To be able to actually extract something from the evaluations, I 
have in a Weberian spirit attempted to construct ideal types (in chapter 3 below) 
and have these in mind when reading the evaluations. I will make one ideal type 
where administration in Europe is organized according to one single European 
model, imposed by supranational influence. I call this ideal type European 
Administrative Space (EAS). The contrasting ideal type is called National 
Administrative Tradition (NAT) and it opposes every effort to weaken national 
administrative traditions. It is important to remember that these ideal types not 
necessarily have any analogue in the empirical reality, but are constructed 
ideological extremes to facilitate text analysis (Bergström & Boréus 2005 p. 159 
ff.). 
Twinning has been in use in its present form since 1998 when DG 
enlargement decided to replace the highly unpopular Technical Assistance (TA) 
strategy (Tulmets 2005 p. 659, O’Connor & Kowalski 2005 p. 437). Since then, 
over 1300 Twinning projects have been carried through only within the PHARE-
countries (TSCT-IBU 2007). Evaluations of singular Twinning projects are 
immense. On the advice of the Swedish Twinning National Contact Point (NCP), 
I have decided to study only such evaluations that assess the Twinning instrument 
as such, rather than individual projects. The latter tend to be highly technical and 
would not contribute to improved understanding of administrative integration in 
Europe.  
Evaluations of the Twinning instrument as such are far from countless; in fact, 
I have studied every evaluation that I have been able to find to get a sufficiently 
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large material to draw conclusions from. It gives me the luxury to not motivate 
exclusions in my empirical material. There is thus no bias in the selection of 
material. Additional information of the evaluations is found in chapter four. 
Why not then to study the actors themselves, and ask how they comprehend 
European administrative integration or read their statements of administrative 
issues, instead of taking the methodological detour of Twinning evaluations? 
It is important to recognize in relation to this question that administrative 
integration is a sensitive subject, even in relation to the new member states and 
their administrations. Administrative ‘ways of doing things’ are, as mentioned, 
deeply entrenched in national traditions. It would be political suicide for the 
Commission for instance to publicly announce that they wish to replace national 
models of administration with a single European model (e.g. Sigma 1998b p. 13). 
If they have such a hidden agenda, it may however be revealed in evaluations of 
Twinning, according to the reasoning above.  
1.3 Theory 
My theoretical understanding is gathered from the literature of how national 
administrations and policies are influenced and transformed by what happens at 
the European level. This research-field is called Europeanization. Europeanization 
is mainly explained using rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism, and this is a road that also I will follow. However, I have found 
that the third branch of the ‘new institutionalism’, Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
is able to complement our understanding of Europeanization, particularly in 
administrative issues as we will see. HI argues that institutional choices are sticky, 
once an administration for instance is organised in one way, it is difficult and 
resource-demanding to change it. Administrative systems become ‘path 
dependent’ and face increasing returns (Pierson 2000). My understanding of 
administrations as nationally entrenched is reflected in both a sociological and 
historical institutionalism. I will develop the theoretical point of departure further 
below.  
1.4 Disposition 
In chapter two, my second question is discussed, namely the connection between 
Twinning and Europeanization on the one hand and between Europeanization and 
administrative integration on the other. Chapter three develops my two ideal 
models and discusses the problem of relating different actors to different 
administrative models. Chapter four contains the findings from the evaluations. 
The final part is the conclusion, where the most important results are emphasized.  
  7 
2 Studying Administrative Integration 
through Twinning and Europeanization 
Institutional and administrative capacity was not included in the Copenhagen 
Criteria and it has traditionally not been a matter of supranational influence, the 
Commission has had no power to reform the national administrations within the 
EU (Olsen 2007 p. 260-1). However, the CEECs were in the 1995 Madrid summit 
demanded to “adapt” their administrative structures to be able to implement and 
enforce EU legislation (DG Enlargement website 2009). The Commission 
recognized that CEECs’ administrations had to be improved for acquis 
communautaire to be implemented. 
The administrations in the CEECs were frequently described as weak during 
the 1990s and the measures taken by the Commission within the Phare-
programme, mainly the so called Technical Assistance, TA, proved to have poor 
results (Tulmets 2005 p. 659). The Commission therefore had to try fresh tools to 
strengthen institutional capacity. 
“The puzzle was: while there is no acquis communautaire on administration, 
how could the Commission bring the candidate states to reform their institutions, 
thus to adopt a European ‘model’ that is not defined?” (Tulmets 2005 p. 660). 
2.1 What is Twinning? 
The Institutional Twinning instrument was launched 1998 and quickly became the 
most important mechanism to support administrations in candidate countries 
(O’Connor & Kowalski 2005 p. 437). Other international aid organisations, for 
instance Sida and the World Bank, have used the instrument since the 1980s, but 
the massive scale on which the EU made Twinning available for its candidate 
countries was unsurpassed (World Bank 2004 p. 4-10). The central purpose of 
Twinning is to enable the recipient country to implement EU laws and policies. 
2005, over 1300 Twinning projects had been conducted in over 25 countries and 
the EU had invested more than € 1 billion in the programme (TSCT-IBU 2007). 
In 2002 it was extended and is now a possible tool in the EU’s neighbourhood 
policy (see appendix A). I will study the new member states and the candidate 
countries. 
Twinning is a much institutionalized measure to enable institutional learning. 
The Beneficiary Country (BC) identifies an area where it believes that problems 
may arise in implementing the acquis. The BC plans a Twinning project and gets 
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the details approved by the Commission. It then writes an inquiry to the member 
states’ National Contact Points, the NCPs, who delegates the project to a relevant 
authority or ministry in the MS. A BC jury judges the proposals that it receives 
from the member states. It is possible for MSs to join together in a consortium of 
two to improve their chances to win the project. The chosen MS draw up a so-
called Twinning convention, including the ‘guaranteed results’ that the project 
must fulfil. The MS then sends a Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA) who work 
full time in the BC for up till two years (European Communities 2006, European 
Commission 2007). There is also a project leader in the BC and in the MS and 
detailed reports are regularly sent to the Commission delegation (Ibid.).  
The BC often chooses a MS that it is used to collaborate with. National 
identities influence this choice, but more often is it strategic reasons behind the 
selection (Tulmets 2005 p. 665). According to the Twinning manual, written by 
the Commission, it is the BCs that take full responsibility for selecting the 
administrations that are to be in question for Twinning and for choosing MS 
(European Commission 2007 p. 37). Papadimitriou and Phinnemore have shown 
though that the Commission delegation often has a say in this process (2004 p. 
627). Perhaps this is why the RTAs sometimes are viewed upon as Brussels-spies, 
and the feeling of partnership is seldom achieved (Cooper & Johanssen 
Evaluation 2003 p. 6, Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2004). 
Twinning has a number of distinct features. It is often claimed to contain 
important inspiration from the New Public Management and the Open Method of 
Coordination (Tulmets 2005). The most important characteristics that DG 
Enlargement themselves emphasize are that the objectives are jointly agreed, that 
“the beneficiary country retains ownership” (European Communities 2006 p. 8), 
that the projects have ‘guaranteed results’, that it contains peer-to-peer advise 
from public sector expertise and that it is based on partnership (Ibid.).  
Twinning implies a very close cooperation between a member state 
administration, a beneficiary state administration and the Commission over a long 
period of time. It covers not only the period when a RTA engages in the daily 
work of the BC administration and the entire MS administration in general and the 
MS project leader in particular assist the BC administration. It also covers the 
period when a Twinning Contract and a Work Plan are drafted and the period after 
when follow-ups are made. In addition, some of the administrations sustain their 
close cooperation in their further work after the Twinning project and its 
aftermath are finished (Cooper & Johansson 2003 p. 7).  
2.2 What is Europeanization? A Theoretical Odyssey 
The definition of Europeanization that I will use in this study is borrowed from 
one of the most influential Europeanization scholars, Claudio M. Radaelli:  
Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘way of doing things’ 
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and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the 
making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies. (Radaelli 
2003 p. 30) 
Note that Europeanization is neither a theory, nor an empirical outcome like for 
instance convergence, but a process. Europeanization is thus a phenomenon with 
convergence as one possible but not certain outcome (Matei & Matei 2008 p. 37). 
I will almost exclusively discuss Europeanization on administrative issues, i.e. 
using the above definition but using Occam’s razor to focus on administration. 
However, Europeanization consists of two different ways of influencing domestic 
politics, vertical and horizontal Europeanization (Radaelli 2003 p. 40-44). 
Twinning definitely contributes to vertical Europeanization on the kinds of public 
policy areas that are in the focus of the particular project, by enabling BS to 
implement the acquis communautaire. But this is the main and uncontested 
purpose of the programme. Much more interesting is the effect Twinning and 
Europeanization may have on administrative integration. Kassim has shown that 
the theories predicts quite opposite outcomes on administrative integration, which 
we will see below (Kassim 2003 p. 88). 
Europeanization stands on two theoretical legs. As earlier mentioned, it is a 
manifestation of the institutional turn in political science and it collects its 
explanatory factors from Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological 
Institutionalism. RCI commonly emphasizes the importance of fit/misfit, multiple 
veto points and formal institutions to explain the existence or non-existence of 
Europeanization while SI focuses on norm entrepreneurs and political cultures 
(Börzel & Risse 2003 p. 58-73). RCI and SI are not mutually exclusive. They 
cooperate in providing explanatory power of different phases of Europeanization 
(Ibid. p. 68-9). As earlier mentioned, I have included Historical Institutionalism in 
my discussion. 
2.2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism and Europeanization 
The fit/misfit-model predicts that if an institution or a policy is perfectly 
compatible with its European counterpart, no Europeanization can take place. If 
the misfit is very large, the adaptation cost that it would imply to approach a 
hypothetical European model might be overwhelming. In between these two 
extremes, the misfit will provide with pressure towards convergence, and 
Europeanization will arise (Radaelli 2003 p. 45-46). The fit/misfit model has seen 
its explanatory power decrease somewhat as scholars have found deviating 
examples, and it is sometimes criticized for being overly simplistic (Ibid; 
Andersen 2004).  
Veto-players can block any reform proposals and thereby obstruct the 
Europeanization process. The higher the number of formal or factual veto points, 
the lesser the probability of policy or administrative integration. Veto points can 
be circumvented if there is a political culture of consensual decision-making and 
cooperation. Administrative structures will more readily be adjusted if veto points 
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are absent and if there is a cooperative decisional tradition (Héritier 2001 p. 44-
45). 
Europeanization takes advantage of formal institutions that provide the frames 
for reform. When the process has started, it often implies a redistribution of 
resources, which alter the actors’ logics of consequentialism. Europeanization is a 
window of opportunity that changes the domestic cost-benefit calculations (Börzel 
1999 p. 575-580).  
RCI believes that convergence of administrations is the most likely effect of 
Europeanization in this area. Rational actors copy the best available model, and 
administrative integration will thus mean that the most successful national model 
of administration will develop into a pan-European model (Kassim in 2003 p. 88-
9).  
2.2.2 Sociological Institutionalism and Europeanization 
SI emphasizes the logic of appropriateness and predicts that individuals strive to 
fulfil social expectations (March & Olsen 2004 p. 4). SI believes that 
Europeanization provides new sets of norms and ideas of what kind of situations 
and behaviour is appropriate.  
Institutions that frequently interact and engage in different kinds of 
interchange will approach each other in terms of culture, framing of problems and 
priorities and so on. This is called institutional isomorphism and predicts that 
organizations that interact will homogenize over time. It happens through 
coercion, normative imitation or mimicry to avoid uncertainty (Olsen 2007 p. 
229). 
SI Europeanization can alternatively be understood as influence from norm 
entrepreneurs. Politics are influenced by strong networks which often are 
dominated by individuals who may initiate change by their mere existence. The 
central bankers for instance bore a heavy burden to induce a monetarist approach 
in domestic policy throughout Europe. Furthermore, in SI theory, informal 
institutions are more important than formal. It is the informal institutions that 
above all determine what behaviour is appropriate in a given situation (Börzel & 
Risse 2003 p. 67-8).  
SI tends to be sceptical towards convergence as a result of Europeanization in 
administrative issues (or other cases where there does not exist a clear European 
model). SI argues that administrations interpret new challenges i.e. EU 
requirements or increased competitiveness between different models in 
accordance to the norms that are embedded within the existing organization. All 
convergence is therefore merely a play to for the gallery (Kassim 2003 p. 89). 
2.2.3 Historical Institutionalism and Europeanization 
HI is usually not included to provide explanatory power of the Europeanization 
phenomenon, although exceptions do exist. It is worth mentioning Bulmer here 
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(2007 p. 56), who argues that HI is underused in Europeanization-related theory. I 
see it not as much as a way to understand Europeanization, but more as a way to 
understand the institutional environment that surrounds the subjects of 
Europeanization. 
HI argues that institutional choices are path dependent. It means that  
“[T]he cost of switching from one alternative to another will, in certain social 
contexts, increase markedly over time” (Pierson 2000 p. 251). 
The institutional matrix that surrounds a society at a given time shapes the mental 
maps of its inhabitants. People, and existing institutions, make their strategic 
choices in relation to the possibilities that institutions give them. Every actor 
thereby learns from and adapts to the institutional matrix and renders it very 
difficult to change. In addition, many institutions face high start-up costs and 
‘increasing returns’, which mean that it is difficult to change the nature of an 
institution once in place, and the difficulties increase with time (Pierson 2000 p. 
255). The institution invests energy, resources and human capital in coming into 
being. It is easy to find examples of this in the real world. A person’s first 
employment, although partly random due to the employment market at the time, 
has big implications on that person’s future career as it shapes social expectations 
of both the individual and future employers. Examples are equally easy to find at 
the level of European integration, where European supranational institutions, once 
created, struggle hard to sustain its influence (Pierson 1996). 
HI complements the Europeanization literature with a touch of humbleness. In 
particular RCI tends to argue that only the best type of policies and 
administrations in Europe will survive, as the other identify its superiority and 
adapts accordingly (see above). HI shows that administrative models, deeply 
entrenched in the national mind-maps and institutional matrix, are not so easily 
transformed. One can argue that the administrations in the CEECs have climbed 
quite far on their branch, which makes it difficult to switch to another branch even 
if it may reach higher up towards the sky.  
2.3 Does Twinning produce Europeanization? 
To answer this, one must not only know the theoretical 
foundation of Europeanization, but also how it actually 
happens in the European countries. As mentioned, there 
are two categories; direct/vertical and horizontal 
Europeanization.  
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2.3.1 Twinning and Vertical Europeanization 
Vertical, direct, top-down or hierarchical Europeanization is the effect European 
legislation implementation has on domestic policies (Bulmer 2007 p. 51-2). This 
is where the fit/misfit-model usually comes in. The political integration in Europe 
has become deeper as the Union has gained influence over more areas. When new 
members are entering, they must adjust to EC-law. They were willing to do this, 
because the incentives posed to them under conditionality were strong. ‘The 
Return to Europe’ was the primary goal in the CEECs foreign policy and the 
negotiations preceding the accession implied an unrivalled possibility for the EU 
to enforce adjustment (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier p. 88-92).  
The administrative capacity was insufficient in many CEECs which made it 
difficult for them to implement and enforce the acquis. Therefore Twinning made 
entry. In the Twinning contract that is signed by the BC, MS and the Commission, 
it must be clearly stated how the project is to achieve acquis implementation 
(European Commission 2007). Most of the projects are successful in achieving 
this policy cohesion and construct, diffuse and institutionalize these formal rules 
of public policies. Europeanization is thereby a clear result of Twinning
2
. Or 
rather, Twinning enables the Europeanization that is necessary as a minimum for 
a country to access the Union as a member state. 
This type of direct top-down enforcement is much less common on 
administrative issues. The reason is that there exist no European model, no 
blueprint, to enforce upon the MS. Therefore, Twinning projects does not have 
institutional integration as explicit purpose. In some cases, as we will see, 
administrative integration has been relabelled to fall under a less sensitive label 
(see chapter four). 
2.3.2 Twinning and Horizontal Europeanization 
Horizontal, or indirect, Europeanization is Europeanization that is not connected 
to the implementation of legislation, but rather of increased exchange of 
information and a bigger market of models to find inspiration of. It is often more 
difficult to see and measure for a student of Europeanization, than direct effects 
due to acquis implementation are.  
It is sometimes argued that the Open Method of Coordination, OMC, is one 
example (Matei & Matei 2008 p. 37, Vink & Graziano 2007 p. 10).  OMC is taken 
from the corporate governance world and emphasizes partnership, benchmarking, 
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However, it is not certain that acquis implementation always, by definition, is Europeanization. According to 
Radaelli and Pasquier, mere implementation of EU legislation is not sufficient for Europeanization (2007 p. 37). 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier also point to the fact that much of the acquis implementation during 
conditionality was Potemkin harmonization (2007 p. 95).  
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peer reviews, evaluations, action plans and so on. It is related to New Public 
Management ideals. OMC influences the implementation process mostly in those 
areas where the community method of legislation is not used, for instance social 
policy and employment issues. OMC is more non-hierarchical than legislative 
rules, but the downside for the Union is that there is no way of sanctioning a state 
that fails in the OMC method or remains passive. Under OMC, the council defines 
the benchmarks that the states are to follow. The Commission is responsible to 
manage and to supervise the progress. Europeanization is more or less voluntary 
under OMC, and it works through sociological, rather than rational, mechanisms 
of institutionalism (Wincott 2003 p. 296-297). OMC seeks to find a European 
model from national elements by finding a Best Practice in Europe. The idea is 
that once an institution is perceived to function in a superior way, other 
institutions will, by Commission assistance, gradually transform itself to approach 
the Best Practice model (Ibid.). 
OMC is highly integrated in the Twinning programme and Twinning thereby 
contributes in diffusing this form of administrative integration (Tulmets 2005 p. 
663-6). Tulmets argues that the influence and use of OMC is strongest in those 
cases were acquis is absent, for instance administrative issues. When engaging in 
Twinning, both MS and BC adjust to the OMC ideals (Ibid.).  
2.4 Does Twinning and Europeanization produce 
Administrative Integration? 
 
Administrative integration is a form of 
institutional change. Institutional 
change is most commonly described 
as happening through coercion, 
mimetic or normative adaptation, building on a much cited article by DiMaggio 
and Powell from 1991 (e.g. Königová et al 2006 p. 17). This way of explaining 
institutional change has the advantage of including both rational choice and 
sociological logics. Coercion takes place in the Twinning programme through the 
formal pressure of conditionality, but also through informal pressure from MS 
project leaders and the like.  
During the entire period under transition, the CEEC have been under constant 
change. In such uncertain environment, institutions are more likely to turn to 
mimetic for inspiration and development, rather than trusting their own ability to 
provide a way forward (Königová et al 2006 p. 17). In the CEEC, the ‘Return to 
Europe’ was the main purpose of politics. Many Europeanization scholars that are 
sceptical of Europeanization of administration think that it for this reason may 
apply to the candidate countries (e.g. Olsen 2007 p. 267-8). However, Twinning is 
also strategically used by the BCs. By merely labelling a project as successful, 
they are able to check of that part of the acquis list, and move closer to accession 
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(Tulmets 2005 p. 672-3). Twinning is used to formally accept the acquis, but the 
BCs find ways during the project period to deviate as much as possible from the 
European course to avoid adjustment costs (Ibid.). 
Perhaps the most vivid way that Twinning may provide institutional change 
and European administrative integration is through the creation of 
professionalization. It concerns the normative adaptation concept and sociological 
institutionalism. Twinning creates network of officials who soon begin to frame 
problems and solutions in similar ways (Königová et al 2006 p. 17). The concept 
of isomorphism applies here. Isomorphism refers to the phenomenon that if two 
institutions have frequent contact and interaction, they will develop similarly and 
gradually converge (Olsen 2007 p. 229). 
Through these three different ways of enabling institutional change, Twinning 
facilitates individual, collective and organisational learning in administrative 
issues (Königová et al 2006 p. 17).  
However, it is most unclear whether the result of Twinning will be 
convergence, understood as less variety of administrative styles within the EU. 
Grabbe, for instance, argues that the Twinning programme is not centrally 
controlled by the Commission, but rather supervised, and that the Twinning 
agents come from many different MSs. This has the effect that the CEECs import 
the administrative heterogeneity that marks the EU (Grabbe 2001 p. 1024-27). 
The BC collects inspiration from one member state in one area, and another in 
another area, but without adopting a distinctive new model.  
Twinning has had some tangible effects on organisation of public administration 
in all the BCs at an early stage, i.e. even before accession. Twinning reinforced 
the national administrations’ bonds to Brussels. This communication had to take 
the detour of an agency under the executive government, for example when the 
Commission approved the Twinning contracts. Thus, Twinning contributed to 
centralise the communication with Brussels, imitating the French and British 
system (Tulmets 2005 p. 666-7). Another effect has been the establishment of 
agencies in each BC to manage the money-flow associated with Twinning 
(Tulmets 2005 p. 667-8).  
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3 Ideal Types and the Reality 
Ten years ago, the concluding paper 
after a huge seminar on administrative 
reform arranged by Sigma stated: 
“It is clear that a European Administrative Space is now beginning to emerge.” 
(Sigma 1998:a p. 15) 
Where is EAS today, ten years after the seminar? According to Hofmann, inspired 
by Olsen, EAS is the ever more integrated administration in the EU that will lead 
to a common European model (2008 p. 662). Hence, EAS is still a process, an 
ever-more integrating administration in Europe. 
The European Administrative Space itself does not spell out its administrative 
model in the literature. It is merely described as increased integration between 
national and European level administrations (Balint et al 2008), and the blurring 
of the two levels (Hofmann 2008 p. 668).  
Therefore, when I refer to EAS, I somewhat distance myself from the common 
definitions. I embrace both the contemporary integration of administration that is 
enforced as a by-product of the EU, and the supposed European model that lies in 
the end of the integration road. Matei and Matei conclude in their recent 
assessment that EAS: 
“[A]ppears as the closure for a large process that implies convergence, 
Europeanization and administrative dynamics” (2008 p. 46). 
Scherperel (2004) has in one study compared a European Administrative Space 
ideal type with one of State-Socialist Administrative Space (SSAS) that he argues 
marks the CEE countries. I will use his comparison in my reading of the 
evaluations but I will problemize his model and contrast it with the clear 
divergence that colours the contemporary administrative organisation in Europe.  
According to Scherperel the administrative spaces differ in six important 
aspects that it is possible to operationalize. EAS is characterized by (Scherperel 
2004 p. 560-1); 
• bureaucrats are gathered from the ‘crème’ of university graduates and 
enjoy a high degree of social status, 
• EAS administrations cooperate in between ministries and are coloured 
by horizontal coordination, 
• bureaucrats are employed by the state, and identify themselves as 
officers in state, rather than in individual ministries or authorities,  
• career opportunities are high and built on individual merits (see 
discussion below though), 
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• although administrations are entrenched in nation-states, the degree of 
international cooperation within the EU is very high and a European 
identity is slowly emerging among bureaucrats, 
• EAS administrations are relatively depoliticized (see discussion below 
though). 
By contrast, the administrative space that has marked the CEE countries since the 
early fifties is characterized by (Scherperel 2004 p. 554-60); 
• low prestige and low wages in administrative sector, and this has been 
a big problem in the development of CEECs’ administrations since the 
fall of communism, 
• SSAS is “highly fragmented […] and privileges vertical over 
horizontal coordination”, 
• there exists no identification with bureaucrats as a social group in 
CEEC, 
• there is  little opportunity for career within the public administration, 
• international cooperation between administrations is rare, 
• administrative management is highly politicized. 
Scherperel’s ideal types are summed up in the table below. As we so far have 
discussed Europe as an area where administration is highly nation-based, I will 
now discuss how the EAS ideal type can be questioned. 
Characteristics of State-Socialist Administrative Space (SSAS) 
and European Administrative Space (EAS) 
Characteristics SSAS EAS 
Wages and social prestige of employment in 
state administration 
Low High 
Foremost direction of administrative 
communication/coordination 
Vertical Horizontal 
Identification with civil service as distinctive 
social group 
Low High 
Employment system Position based Career based 
Frequency of contact with international 
organizations and other states’ bureaucrats 
Low High 
Nature of relationship to politics Politicized Depoliticized 
Source: Scherperel 2004 p. 562 
 
I will control four of these variables in my investigation of the evaluations. 
‘Identification with civil service as distinctive social group’ is a variable more 
suitable in an interview-based study and is difficult to include by studying 
evaluations. International contacts are the bearing idea behind Twinning and this 
variable is fundamentally affected by the Twinning projects. Sometimes the 
relationship between the BC and the MS is sustained even after the project is 
terminated.  
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3.1 Key Features of Administration within the 
Commission 
According to a recent study by Balint, Bauer and the renowned Christoph Knill 
(2008), there are two distinct ways of organising administration among the 
member states in Europe. The authors have used what they label the ‘standard 
method’ of comparing administrations, namely the degree of politicization of 
higher management on one axis and the openness of the career system on the 
other (Balint et al. 2008 p. 682ff.). They find that the Commission has taken large 
steps of approaching UK and Scandinavian models of administration at the 
expense of the Napoleonic continental model. 
“The Commission clearly moves in the direction of the Anglo-Scandinavian 
position” (Balint et al 2008 p. 691).  
That means that the Commission has become considerably less politicised in 
management and more open in recruitment (Ibid. p. 685). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also Schout and Jordan have shown that the Commission has moved away from a 
Napoleonic type of administration towards a more Weberian bureaucracy, less 
hierarchical and more rule-driven, with efficiency and network management as 
catchwords (2008 p. 969-970).  
3.2 Key Features of Administration within Official 
Guidelines 
The Commission and other supranational actors related to it have published 
guidelines in administrative issues in a number of documents. They are often 
written in a high-flown and general manner, with no tangible propositions of how 
Source:Balint et al 2008 
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to arrange administration. In fact, the Commission seems very careful not to cross 
any limits of its mandate. It often emphasizes that it is up to the MSs to decide 
how to arrange their public administration. In the European Governance – a 
White Paper for instance, the Commission even wants to:  
“[B]ring greater flexibility into how Community legislation can be implemented 
in a way which takes account of regional and local conditions” (European 
Commission 2001 p. 4). 
Sigma is an organisation till 90 % financed by the DG Enlargement’s Phare 
programme but under the supervision of OECD. It is engaged in promoting 
minimum standards for the national administrations in the CEECs. Sigma’s 
publications clearly state that the Commission is not engaged in instructing the 
CCs of how to organize their national administrations, but is merely demanding a 
minimum administrative capacity, all along its mandate: 
“The Commission was careful not to impose a[n administrative] model” (Sigma 
1998b p. 13). 
Thus, the recommendations given by Sigma and the Commission are emphasizing 
broad principles
3
 that are not politically sensitive. 
Using Balint’s ‘standard’ model described above of comparing administrations 
according to their degree of politicization and openness in HR-policy, Sigma 
seems to prefer an Anglo-Scandinavian model arguing that career opportunities 
and wage levels ought to be well regulated and open (Sigma 1999 p. 11, 21), 
which would imply a model to the far right in the scatter above. Furthermore, 
Sigma argues that the public domain of politics “as far as possible” ought to be 
distinguished from the public domain of administration, which I interpret as a 
preference of a model close to the bottom in the scatter. Thus, the European model 
according to Sigma ends up in the Anglo-Scandinavian group of administrative 
models.   
3.3 National Administrative Tradition 
NAT
4
 means the prioritization of nationally entrenched administration over 
possible gains by converging it into a European model. It is a challenging task to 
settle whether an administrative structure is nationally entrenched and therefore 
not desirable to transform from simple malfunction of the administration. Clearly 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3
 Reliability, predictability, openness and transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, (Sigma 1999 
p. 8). Although these are general principles, they are not entrenched in every administrative tradition throughout 
the member states. Sigma for instance points out that many old member states states are too rigid in deeming 
documents classified, when they ought to be public (Sigma 1999 p. 15). 
4
 There exist three groups of national administrative traditions. SSAS is of particular interest because it is the one 
that dominate the CEEC administrations. We have also come across the Anglo-Scandinavian model and the 
Napoleonic model. All three fall under the NAT umbrella, if they are prioritized over increased integration. 
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certain characteristics of the SSAS model are example of the latter, most notably 
the low status of working in public administration and the resulting high staff 
turnover rate. Other cases are more unclear. Vertical coordination for instance is 
not necessarily a manifestation of bad administration, but possibly a manifestation 
of a certain political culture that is not inferior to another political culture with 
horizontal coordination (Kassim 2003 p. 104). If this feature is inherently 
unaccepted it is indicated that distinctive features of the National Administrative 
Tradition in CEEC is not accepted. If the evaluations instead are judging the 
negative outcomes (if any) of the lack of horizontal coordination, the NAT might 
still be accepted as such. 
3.4 The Sliding Scale – Europeanization and 
National Models 
The administrative development of the Commission described above indicates 
that we need to problemize the EAS concept. The sharp edges of national 
administrative traditions have eroded somewhat during the last decade. However, 
as we have seen, Europeanization and administrative integration does not 
necessarily mean convergence (Andersen 2004 p.23, Goetz 2001, Grabbe 2001). 
Still, two contrasting administrative models persist within the EU, in addition to 
the SSAS model in the new member states.  
I follow Balint, Bauer and Knill’s (2008) example and label these two models 
Anglo-Scandinavian and Napoleonic. Olsen (2007 p. 256 ff.) has a different 
approach and label the two models New Public Management and Old Public 
Administration, a less geographic labelling that has the advantage of making it 
possible to have two models co-existing within the same member state. However, 
the point to emphasize is that there exist two essentially different administrative 
models within the European Administrative Space.  
3.4.1 Hypotheses concerning degree of SSAS-acceptance 
Börzel and Risse argue that it is most convenient for a state to ‘upload’ their own 
‘way of doing things’ to the EU-level, in order to avoid adaption costs related to 
Europeanization when the MS implements it (2003 p. 62). Particularly the big and 
powerful states have the potential to be successful in the uploading type of 
endeavour. Also Kassim emphasizes that it is political and economically costly to 
be far from the position that the Commission prefers (2003 p. 84). When it comes 
to administration, it seems like the Anglo-Scandinavian model has drawn the 
winning ticket. As shown in previous passages, both the development within the 
Commission’s administration and the guidelines published by Sigma indicates 
that central European actors prefer an Anglo-Scandinavian model.  
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According to Wincott, it has been an outspoken strategy in the UK, especially 
under Blair, to make their model in different issues become the pan-European 
model, through the process of OMC. Thereby Labour would avoid to ‘take’ 
policies shaped elsewhere (Wincott p. 297). UK is thus an active player in shaping 
the EAS.  
Does this mean that UK and the other Anglo-Scandinavian countries with 
necessity disapprove of the SSAS model found in CEEC? My hypothesis, 
presented in chapter one, argues that this will not necessarily be the case. Such a 
statement would be an important precedent that might hit back on the Anglo-
Scandinavian countries in another policy area. They are also traditionally Euro-
sceptic countries, indicating that they might resist a development where the 
Commission by Twinning or other means enforces a European model. Member 
states have guarded their administrative turf vis-à-vis the Commission jealously 
and have been reluctant to grant even supervisory competence to supranational 
institutions (Olsen 2007 p. 261). 
However, I argue that the Anglo-Scandinavian states will be more 
disapproving of the SSAS model than the Napoleonic countries. The Commission 
has stated that even many of the EU15 MS are underachievers, and that it would 
like to see that the Twinning instrument was available also for these countries, to 
improve (or even transform) their administrative model (European Commission 
2001 p. 25)
5
. I argue that countries with a different administrative model than the 
one the Commission prefers, oppose such a development and thereby accept the 
deviations in the CEECs to a greater degree. 
I therefore argue that we will find values in the evaluations of along the scale 
in the figure. The Commission will be most disapproving of the SSAS model, 
thereby promoting the European Administrative Space, followed by the Anglo-
Scandinavian groups of countries, while the Napoleonic group is more accepting, 
emphasizing the superiority of National Administrative Traditions. 
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 According to Sigma, it is possible to rank the (old) member states from the best to the worst regarding their 
administrative model (Sigma 1999 p. 15). 
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4 Analysis - Evaluating Evaluations 
Twinning evaluations have been 
conducted en masse. Most of these 
concern a single project and are 
highly technical. Moreover, they are 
far from being objective reflections 
of the reality. Tulmets (2005) shows 
that such follow-ups often are 
described in an exaggerated positive 
tone. The reason for this becomes 
clear when reading the Commission’s reply to the evaluation conducted by the 
Court of Auditors who argues that the Commission treats the BCs with kid 
gloves—if a Twinning project fails it has immediate consequences for that 
country’s accession negotiations (Special Report No 6/2003 by the Court of 
Auditors, p. 52).  
A much smaller number of evaluations concern the instrument as such and are 
more suitable as the empirical material of my thesis. A compilation of all 
evaluations studied is found in Appendix B. To facilitate for the reader, I have in 
the MS case chosen to refer to the evaluations by their assigner. I write (Swedish 
Ev. 2003) instead of referring to actual author or the consultancy firm that they 
work for. Appendix B provide the interested reader with more detailed 
information. Hence, if a MS is mentioned in the reference, it is a MS-ordered 
evaluation, if not, it is ordered by the Commission.  
I have gathered these evaluations by searching the Internet for evaluations, 
then by sending an inquiry to all the NCPs under the Phare and Cards programme 
and in the old member states, in total 35 NCPs. A number of them answered my 
request and extended my list of evaluations. The lists were almost identical in all 
cases, and I have good reason to believe that I have found all relevant evaluations. 
In addition, the DG enlargement’s Twinning office helped me to find material 
after a similar enquiry.  
4.1 SSAS - Alive and Kicking 
It becomes evident when reading the evaluations that one cannot change from the 
SSAS to the EAS overnight. Institutional structures persist and constrain reform 
efforts, just as the ‘new institutionalisms’ predict (Pollack 2005 p. 137-156).  
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4.1.1 Staff Turnover 
Almost all evaluations point to the fact that the high fluctuation of key personnel 
is a major problem (e.g. Czech Ev. 2006 p. 20). As pointed out in the SSAS model 
above, the status of working in public administration is low, as are the wages. 
Involvement in a Twinning project means international exchange, additional 
vocational training etcetera which becomes a valuable merit for the employees on 
the labour market (German Ev. 2006 p. 12). Thus, Twinning itself hasten the staff 
turnover which lowers the sustainability of the project. Here we see institutionalist 
explanations in practice. Previous ‘choices’ in the public administrative sphere—
low competence in PA and officials being paid poorly—hit back on reform 
initiatives. Pierson’s relative cost of switching path is as predicted higher than 
staying on the same path (2000 p. 252). When the Twinning programme tries to 
increase competence in the PA, trained individuals are recruited by private sector. 
The Twinning project does not include any knowledge management tool to 
ensure that knowledge stays in the organisation in spite of high staff turnover, 
which the German evaluators wish for (German Ev. 2006 p. 12). 
Many studies of the Twinning programme mention that the BC officials claim 
that the RTAs are over-paid (e.g. Tulmets 2005 p. 671). There is a risk that the 
cooperative environment is impaired by the often excessive differences in income. 
However, many times it is disadvantageous for the individual RTA to be away 
from his home office for two years or more and it is sometimes difficult to 
convince competent individuals to engage in Twinning (Lithuanian Ev. 2007 p. 2, 
Czech Ev. 2006 p. 44-5). Decreasing the pay of the RTAs is therefore not a 
solution to any problem. The problem is the low status of being a bureaucrat in the 
CEECs.   
4.1.2 Horizontal Co-operation 
Another characteristic in the SSAS is the low degree of horizontal co-operation. 
This is frequently
6
 mentioned as a problem by all evaluators; even the CEEC ones 
(Czech Rep. Ev. 2006 p. 61).  
The lack of horizontal co-operation is a problem that most Twinning projects 
actually address, through the elaboration of interministerial working groups etc. 
Thus, Twinning contributes to the Europeanization of administration and the 
convergence of administrative organization by strengthening horizontal 
cooperation. This effect is particularly emphasized by supranational evaluators 
and European Commission respondents in other evaluations (DG 
Enlargement/EMS-Consortium 2004 p. 25, German Ev. 2006 p. 20), although the 
positive statements of this development are frequent in several evaluations. The 
OMAS Consortium states that too little emphasis has been put on the lack of 
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 Interestingly, in the German evaluation, the Commission officials and the MS officials mention this as a 
problem, but the BC respondents do not (2006 p. 18) 
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horizontal co-operation within the CEEC administrations. The Commission could 
have enforced conditionality on this issue to a greater extent (DG Enlargement/ 
OMAS 2001b p. 11). Although Twinning in many cases deals with horizontal co-
operation, the initial lack thereof is often a big problem for the functioning of the 
instrument. Twinning projects become isolated islands even when several projects 
within the same policy field share similar objectives (DG Enlargement/ OMAS 
2001b p 12). A more recent evaluation focusing on the Justice and Home Affairs 
inter alia in the then Candidates Bulgaria and Romania states that: 
“All Questionnaire responses for Commission Delegations in Romania and 
Bulgaria express concern about the lack of synergy in interinstitutional co-
operation. This is one of the most negative responses to any question by any 
stakeholder and shows the seriousness of this issue.” (DG Enlargement/ Ecotec 
2006 p. 12) 
Commission-related evaluators often propose that reform and acquis imple-
mentation in any policy field ought to be preceded by a comprehensive national 
strategy. This ensures that several ministries are engaged in the planning and 
preparatory phase and share the same objectives. Thereby, the Twinning 
instrument works in a more co-operative environment. However, opinions differ 
whether national strategies actually have been used in reform programmes. New 
member states officials tend to state that their country followed such strategies 
stringently, contrasted by Commission officials that most often state that such a 
strategy was absent (DG Enlargement/ Ecotec 2006 p. 7-8). Ecotec even 
suggested future Twinning-projects to be conditional on secured inter-institutional 
co-operation. No co-operation, no money, in other words (2006 p. 29). As we 
have seen, the Commission argues that this always has been standard procedure. 
Bureaucrats rarely have a good overview and knowledge and inspiration does 
not diffuse due to the very hierarchical structure of CEEC administration. It is 
therefore essential according to several evaluations related to the Commission that 
the Twinning project is entrenched high up in the hierarchy to assure 
sustainability (DG Enlargement/ OMAS 2001 p. 15, DG Enlargement/OMAS 
2001b p. 15-18, DG Enlargement/ Ecotec 2006 p. 20).  
It is quite clear that vertical organization in the SSAS is not accepted by the 
evaluators. Although some parts of the acquis communautaire surely are 
manageable even without horizontal co-operation, horizontal co-operation is still 
demanded. This therefore might be an area where departure from the SSAS legacy 
and entrance into the EAS is prioritized over ability to implement the acquis. It is 
not self-evident that horizontal co-ordination is essential for good administration. 
It might be a reflection of an administrative culture that exists also within the old 
member states. In Italy, Germany and Greece for instance, the notion of 
departmental autonomy is taken more seriously and coordination is therefore more 
relaxed than in many other member states, most strikingly UK (Kassim 2003 p. 
104). It is therefore interesting that the aversion to the lack of horizontal co-
operation is so strong.  
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4.1.3 Politicization and Employment System 
The degree of politicization of higher management in public administration and 
whether the employment system is career or position based are administrative 
ingredients used in both Balint, Bauer and Knill (2008) and in Scherperel (2004) 
to compare administrations. It is interesting because the degree of politicization 
and the type of employment system differ significantly also within the Union (see 
3.1). My ambition was therefore to compare the evaluations and see if the 
evaluators’ origin and background matter and if their values in these matters are 
revealed in their evaluations. That would also have provided me with a litmus test 
for my method in general. If used as a litmus test, the result is not very 
encouraging. These aspects of administrative integration are barely mentioned in 
the evaluations, which can be compared to the overwhelming information about 
the lack of horizontal co-operation and the high staff turnover, both threatening 
project sustainability.  
Perhaps is also the lack of statements telling? It could be so for several 
reasons:  
• The evaluators are aware that it is a sensitive matter to explicitly 
criticize something that is abundant within a group of member states 
within the European Union, the Napoleonic group. The evaluators 
would therefore watch their step to not annoy their assigners. 
• The evaluators might themselves be entrenched in a Napoleonic 
administrative model with a high degree of politicization and a 
muddled career system, and are therefore unable to discover that ‘the 
Emperor has nothing on’.  
• It could be that the degree of politicization and type of employment 
system do not matter much for the functionality and sustainability of 
the Twinning programme. If so, even if these aspects are perceived as 
peculiarities, the evaluators have no reason to mention them. 
• Finally, it could be that Scherperel is wrong in his claim that these two 
aspects are two of the six aspects that really distinguish the State-
Socialist Administrative Space. One indication is that he ignores the 
fact that these two aspects in fact are very diverse within the European 
Administrative Space, and therefore do not constitute a good basis for 
comparison.  
The first two points might be true for the evaluators ordered by the Commission 
or by member states within a Napoleonic model, for instance Germany, while the 
Anglo-Scandinavian evaluators would be more eager to identify and comment on 
politicization and a position-based, non-transparent, employment system. This 
leaves only the Swedish evaluation in my limited material. Maybe I cannot use 
what Balint, Bauer and Knill call the standard model for administrative 
comparisons (2008 p. 682) as a litmus test after all, at least not with my limited 
empirical material.  
The Czech evaluation mentions that Politicization in the management of 
administration is one the two greatest threats to sustainability of Twinning project 
achievements (the other is high staff turnover) (2006 p. 11). Other evaluations 
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pragmatically conclude that Twinning projects must be sensitive to changed 
political priorities in the BC.  
Only one evaluation touches upon the employment system. Ecotec argues that 
the level of career development ought to be a prioritized part of a national strategy 
on the JHA area that the evaluation concerns (DG Enlargement/ Ecotec 2006 p. 
6).  
4.2 Institutions Matter 
“The administrations of the ancien régime have also proved surprisingly 
resistant to radical transformation” (Olsen 2007 p. 270).  
Communist administrative legacies find new ways to survive and flourish even 
under the external pressure from the EU. According to Olsen, this is partly 
because the uncoordinated voice of the EU’s. The EU itself is ambivalent of what 
model to impose and is weakened by low resources and the fact that the EU has 
no say over administrative processes within the old member states (Olsen 2007 p. 
660ff.). It becomes presumptuous and illegitimate to demand a certain model in 
the new MS, although it is reasonable to demand an appropriate capacity in the 
administrations. Twinning and OMC does provide an answer. Although not all 
actors fully apprehend or concur with the notion of Twinning as partnership 
among peers (e.g. Cooper & Johansen Evaluation 2003 p. 7), the BCs do have a 
relatively important ownership of the instrument and can adjust to best practice 
within Europe
7
 (European Court of Auditors 2003). Ownership is important. 
Almost all evaluations have found a relation between the degree of political 
support and commitment in the BC and the success of the project (e.g. German 
Evaluation 2006 p. 9). What then, determines whether the project has political 
support, or whether the project is treated without full commitment? Reasonably, 
the political priorities in the BC determine whether the project will be fully 
supported, or just carried through with the purpose of ticking of a new part of the 
acquis. For instance, many CEEC seeks cooperation with Ireland in internal 
market-acquis, to duplicate the Irish economic miracle (DG Enlargement/ EMS 
2004 p. 16). This has great political support in the BC, while other issues might 
not be so highly prioritized. It all boils down to the political priorities of the BC, 
which might be difficult to avoid if one wants the BC to have ownership.  
The early evaluations, in particular the one on Public Administrative Reform 
(DG Enlargement/OMAS 2001b p. 9-11), argued that ownership ought to be 
partly transferred from the BC to the MS. The BC was unable due to too poor PA 
to identify their problems, and could not fully appreciate the MS expertise, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7
 One has to be aware of the difficulties when speaking of ’ownership’ of a program. It is very difficult to belay 
that the BCs really have true ownership. Papadimitrou and Phinnemore (2004) suggest that this is not really the 
case. I cite the European Court of Auditors, but include my caveats for casual interpretations.  
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according to the evaluation (Ibid.). This line of reasoning has been toned down in 
later evaluations.  
To sum up; the relatively great BC ownership allows the BC to interpret the 
new influences according to their old traditions and norms. Administrative reform 
becomes path dependent (Tulmets 2005 p. 672). Institutions which are positive to 
Europeanization get Europeanized to a higher degree (Trondal 2007 p. 967). 
4.2.1 Commission Involvement 
 
The evaluations frequently emphasizes that the Commission does not try to 
impose any administrative model (e.g. Czech Ev. 2006, DG Enlargement/ OMAS 
2001 p. I). Many civil officials in the CEECs saw the early Twinning RTAs as 
spies for the Commission, and it made cooperation difficult (Cooper & Johanssen 
Evaluation 2003 p. 6, Tulmets 2005 p. 671). The Commission therefore had to 
increase the notion of partnership and ownership of the Twinning instrument 
among administrations in the CEECs, which they seems to have been relatively 
successful with. Cooperation has become more of a matter of personal chemistry 
than of relations to the Commission. This development is likely to have improved 
the capacity of the Twinning instrument, but the Commission has lost control over 
the direction of many projects.  
The EMS-consortium discusses this problem in their evaluation. They are 
troubled by the fact that the results of many projects disappear in a malfunctioning 
administration. Twinning deals too little with administrative reform, they argue, 
and propose that the RTAs ought to report weaknesses in the BC administration to 
the Commission (DG Enlargement/ EMS 2004 p. 25-26). Also the European 
evaluation conducted by Cooper and Johansen 2003 concluded that Twinning 
should be extended to cover administrative reform issues more often and more 
explicit than currently. Twinning is a suitable instrument for this endeavour, but 
they recognize that western style administrative reform is not easily transferable 
to CEECs (p. 22-4). 
The Commission involvement is therefore a balancing act. If it takes an active 
approach, and for example influences the priorities in the Twinning-project
8
, the 
RTAs are seen as spies and the sustainability of the project is negatively affected.  
“Many East European officials have questioned the notion of partnership within 
twinning, which they saw as a subtle attempt by the Commission of increasing its 
power and control over their internal affairs” (Tulmets 2005 p. 672). 
However, if the Commission is passive many projects risk to be low prioritized in 
the BC and public administration is not improved. Conditionality has been the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8
 Which sometimes happens even though it is formally a responsibility of the BC (DG Enlargement/ EMS 2004 
p. 20) 
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strongest incitement for the BC (Czech Ev. 2006 p. 45), and it is a tool with a 
clear best-before date.  
For Commission officials, administrative capacity is a particularly sensitive 
issue. Especially after the candidate countries were approved as fulfilling the 
political Copenhagen criterion (DG Enlargement/ Ecotec 2006 p. 9). The solution 
was to move administrative capacity concerns to Twinning projects under the 
Justice and Home Affairs acquis, thereby relabeling the administrative projects to 
a less sensitive name (Ibid.). Ecotec tones down this phenomenon, and argues that 
most projects have been explicit in its purpose. But the fact is that it has played a 
role at least in the Commission officials’ minds. 
4.3 Differences in the Evaluations  
Several separation lines could be expected among the actors. There are three 
groups of member states with different administrative models as mentioned; the 
SSAS, the Napoleonic and the Anglo-Scandinavian models. In addition, the 
Commission was expected to prefer increased administrative integration. My 
material is not sufficiently extensive to allow me to make conclusions of 
differences between these four groups.  
Evaluations from OMAS, EMS and Ecotec, all assigned by the DG 
Enlargement, tend to view Commission influence as too small and too indistinct, 
as we have seen above. Clearer Commission explanation of priorities and 
preferred models is needed to enable genuine reform in culture and transformation 
of “deeply entrenched attitudes” (DG Enlargement/ Ecotec 2006 p. III). However, 
the Czech evaluation argues that the Commission has recognized individual 
nations’ need for individual administrative solutions (Czech Ev.2006 p. 11). It is 
telling that central European evaluations complain over too little Commission 
involvement, while BC evaluations describe it as adequate. 
4.3.1 Indicators of Success 
The most striking general difference in the evaluations (i.e. not directly connected 
to my question) is the indicators of success. The member states’ evaluations tend 
to view their own involvement as the overarching goal of Twinning. Twinning is 
seen as a way to strengthen the connections to important new member states 
(Swedish Ev. 2003 p. 2, 18-19, German Ev. 2006 p. 13, Czech Ev. 2006 p. 41-2, 
Lithuanian Ev. 2007). This can be connected to the theoretical discussion above 
concerning that it is advantageous for a MS to have ‘their’ model diffused in the 
EU, and thus try to upload it to the European level (see 3.4.1 above). In the 
Swedish case, it is also motivated by the importance to have good relationship 
with neighbouring countries, which is said to be of particular importance for a 
little country like Sweden (2003 p. 9). Germany also considers improved bilateral 
relations (2006 p. 13) and the Czech evaluation mentions that it is common with 
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so-called ‘deal-making’ to win Twinning contracts (2006 p. 41-2). Also at 
individual level, Twinning is perceived as providing benefits. Cultural and 
language skills are highly valued (Lithuanian Ev. 2007 p. 4).  
Evaluations assigned by the Commission are less concerned of who actually 
conducts the Twinning projects in the BC, and more interested in the degree of 
success of the instrument in terms of implementation ability.  
The Court of Auditors argued in their evaluation from 2003 that the so called 
’guaranteed results’ have not been fulfilled to a satisfactory degree. The 
Commission then answers that Twinning is valuable despite this because it creates 
results that are intangible (behavioural and cultural change through new sources 
of inspiration). But, in the Twinning manual, written by the Commission, it is 
clearly stated that “the sole reason and justification for Twinning is the 
achievement of the mandatory result” (European Commission 2007 p. 88). It is 
clear that the Commission, despite its relatively passive role, is aware of the 
Europeanization effects that Twinning is likely to trigger.  
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5 Conclusion 
Administrative integration is a complicated matter. The Twinning programme has 
contributed to some Europeanization along with the conditionality that preceded 
accession. However, it has mostly been on the terms of the beneficiary states. This 
has had the advantage that administrative capacity has increased in areas 
prioritized by the BC, for instance internal market acquis. It has had the 
disadvantage of not improving administrative capacity very much in areas with 
low political commitment, and it has had low impact on the core characteristics of 
the general administrative model in the CEEC, described as SSAS above.  
Twinning does not automatically and immediately transform CEEC 
administration into a West-European type of administration. However, norms and 
values are being transferred from MS to BC through the mechanism of 
isomorphism and of sociological institutionalism more generally, but only in a 
way that the existing institutions in CEEC admit. New norms and influences are 
interpreted along with old institutional structures. Any administrative reform 
therefore happens gradually and over a long period of time. This is remarkable, as 
the conditionality led many scholars to believe that change would come more 
quickly. 
Within public administration, there is no European blueprint to enforce upon 
the candidate countries. This has allowed the BCs to gather influences from MS of 
their choice. This is in accordance to the OMC principle of ‘Best Practice’. 
However, the notion of best practice seems to be dependent on the observer. 
Almost every member state has been involved in Twinning. This has implied that 
the CEECs have imported the administrative divergence that colours the European 
Union. Convergence has thus not been the effect of Europeanization, although the 
EU27 is somewhat less divergent than it would have been without any 
Europeanization. Twinning is a win-win-win instrument, providing benefits for 
the MS, the BC and the EU. However, one should recognize that progress is slow, 
and it is up to the BC to decide what to do with the new administrative input.  
 
Historical institutionalism argues that the historical path of an institution matters 
for its future development. We have seen how large of an impact the State 
Socialist past has had on the Twinning instrument. Not only are the new 
influences interpreted along old norms and institutional standards, but path 
dependence also has more tangible implications on the sustainability of every 
single Twinning project. The extremely high mobility of staff for instance, 
resulting from low prestige in the public administration sector, prevents 
knowledge from staying in the sector.  
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Evaluators of the Twinning program have confronted many of the characteristics 
within SSAS with great scepticism. This is understandable, since SSAS as 
mentioned threatens the sustainability of Twinning results. However, and more 
remarkable, evaluators seem to be sceptical of SSAS peculiarities even when they 
do not hamper the functionality of Twinning, i.e. that vertical administrative 
communication is prioritized before horizontal in SSAS. 
The Commission has been very careful to not impose a particular European 
model, although I have found indications that it prefers an Anglo-Scandinavian 
type of administration. The responsibility of administration is still a national 
matter, despite the fact that the Commission is very aware of the Europeanization 
side-effects of the Twinning program. Administrative integration is mainly driven 
by the Member States, cheered on by the Commission but not steered by the 
Commission. 
 
Finally, regarding the Twinning program as such, the most common complaint 
about the Twinning agents is that they have limited knowledge of, or interest in, 
local conditions. This has negative effect on the functionality of Twinning.  
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Appendix A 
Countries where the EU Twinning takes place 
PHARE TACIS CARDS MEDA 
Bulgaria Armenia Albania Jordan 
Cyprus Azerbaijan Bosnia Lebanon 
Estonia Georgia Kosovo Morocco 
Croatia Kazakhstan Montenegro Tunisia 
Latvia Kirgizstan Macedonia  
Lithuania Moldavia Serbia  
Malta Mongolia   
Poland Russia   
Romania Tajikistan   
Slovakia Turkmenistan   
Slovenia Ukraine   
Czech Republic Uzbekistan   
Turkey Belarus   
Hungary    
Source: SIDA (2005) Twinning – hörnsten i EU:s utvidgning. 
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Appendix B 
The Evaluations 
Title Author(s) Ordered by Year 
Support to the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis 
(Phare) 
ECOTEC Research 
and Consulting 
DG Enlargement/ European 
Commission 
2006 
Second Generation Twinning – Preliminary 
Findings 
EMS Consortium DG Enlargement/ European 
Commission 
2004 
Thematic Report on Public Administration 
Reform (Phare) 
OMAS Consortium DG Enlargement/ European 
Commission 
2001 
Ad Hoc Report on the Twinning Instrument OMAS Consortium DG Enlargement/ European 
Commission 
2001 
An Evaluation of Completed Twinning Projects Chris Cooper Mikael 
Johansen 
A report presented to the meeting of 
National Contact Points in Brussels 
2003 
Special Report No 6/2003 concerning twinning 
as the main instrument to support institution-
building in candidate countries together with the 
Commission’s replies 
Court of Auditors Court of Auditors 2003 
Phare Country Ex-Post Evaluation and Capacity 
Building 
Country Report – Slovakia 
Consortium of 
consultancy firms  
DG Enlargement/ European 
Commission/ Slovak Aid Coordination 
Unit 
2003 
Twinning Projects: Analysing the Experience of 
“Old” EU Member States and Evaluating Benefits 
of Twinning Out for the Czech Republic 
Königová, Lucie et al. Czech Republic 2006 
Twinning e-VALuation Effect and Value of Five 
Projects with German Participation 
BMWi/GTZ German NCP (?) 2006 
Evaluation of the Promotion of Swedish 
Participation in EU Phare Twinning 
Eurofutures, Dixelius 
& Haglund 
Swedish NCP 2003 
Lithuania‘s participation providing twinning 
assistance: opportunities and problems 
Public Policy and 
Management Institute 
Lithuanian government office 2007 
See References for further information 
 
